Second Circuit RESPA Ruling Rejects New York Borrower’s Mortgage Claims

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The Second Circuit’s decision narrows what a New York borrower can recover under RESPA after mortgage servicers ignore written requests. The ruling against the borrower leaves questions about modest pre-litigation expenses, sharpened by a dissent that rejected the majority’s reasoning on both attorney costs and postage. The dispute turns on a practical distinction: whether a loss came from the underlying loan terms or from a servicer’s failure to respond. That distinction can matter as much as the amount claimed.

The borrower sent qualified written requests seeking account information to Newrez LLC, doing business as Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, and PHH Mortgage Corporation. Neither company responded to her first requests or a second round. RESPA requires servicers to acknowledge these requests within five days. The alleged silence therefore formed the basis of the servicing complaint, but it didn’t by itself establish that every later expense or balance dispute was a recoverable loss under the statute.

Her lawsuit tied three claimed losses to the unanswered requests: $70,277.15 in interest and fees she said were improperly added to her balance after a mortgage modification, $225 paid to an attorney to prepare the follow-up requests, and $3.20 in postage. On November 2, 2026, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the case. The claims varied sharply in size, but each raised a different question about causation or the meaning of damages. The largest claim concerned the source of the disputed charges; the smaller ones concerned what it cost to seek an answer.

Modification charges fell outside the servicing claim

The court found that the disputed interest and fees flowed from the mortgage modification, rather than from the companies’ servicing activity. RESPA addresses mortgage servicing, the majority reasoned; it doesn’t govern the terms of a loan modification. That distinction ended the borrower’s largest claim. The ruling draws a boundary between administering an account and setting or changing the obligations described in a modification.

This was her second complaint. The district court had dismissed an earlier version for failing to allege damages, then allowed her to amend. The more detailed allegations still didn’t connect the charges to servicing conduct. In other words, alleging that the balance was wrong wasn’t enough for this claim; the complaint also had to tie the claimed loss to the kind of conduct RESPA covers. That’s a demanding distinction for borrowers to plead when the disputed account information is the very information they say the servicer withheld.

Here’s the thing: a servicing dispute and a dispute about the terms of a modification can appear together in the same account history, yet the legal analysis may separate them. The ruling doesn’t resolve whether the charges were properly calculated under the modification. It says the borrower’s allegations didn’t make those charges recoverable as damages for the servicing failures at issue. This is more significant than it looks: a borrower may have a concrete balance complaint and still fail to show that the loss was caused by a response failure covered by the statute.

What counts as actual damages?

The $225 attorney expense exposed a sharper divide. RESPA allows borrowers to recover “any actual damages” caused by a servicer’s failure to respond. It separately permits attorney’s fees for plaintiffs who prevail in litigation. The majority treated the two provisions as distinct: because the borrower lost, it said, she couldn’t recover the $225 as attorney’s fees. The question was whether the same payment could instead count as an actual loss tied to the unanswered requests.

The dissent saw the expense differently. The borrower had paid an attorney to prepare follow-up requests, not to bring or pursue a lawsuit. In the dissent’s view, that was a cost of trying to obtain the information the servicers had withheld, and could have been incurred for the same task through a housing counselor. That framing focuses on what the service was for, rather than the professional title of the person who provided it.

That distinction matters because, under the majority’s approach, the service provider determines whether the cost is recoverable: a borrower might claim $225 paid to a housing counselor but not the same amount paid to an attorney for identical work. The dissent read RESPA’s litigation-fee provision as covering work on a lawsuit, such as research, complaint drafting and appeals. Preparing a servicing request, it argued, sits outside that category. The two readings leave a real interpretive divide over whether a pre-suit expense can qualify as actual damages even when it isn’t a litigation fee.

For borrowers, the practical issue is proof as well as classification. A claimed expense must be linked to the servicer’s failure, and the majority’s ruling rejects this particular attorney-preparation cost under the borrower’s circumstances. The dissent would have let the claim proceed for further consideration. Not a settled answer to every form of pre-litigation expense.

The $3.20 postage dispute

The majority also rejected the postage claim, invoking the principle that courts need not concern themselves with trifles. The dissent countered that RESPA authorizes “any actual damages” without setting a minimum amount. It also pointed to the statute’s $2,000 cap on additional damages for patterns of noncompliance as evidence that Congress contemplated claims involving small sums. The disagreement is about statutory meaning: whether a small out-of-pocket cost can qualify at all, and whether a court may set it aside as too minor to address.

The amount is negligible beside the claimed modification charges, but the reasoning could matter in cases where a borrower’s documented losses are small. If you’re working in this space, the key distinction is that the majority rejected the claim before it could become a broader ruling on every modest expense associated with a request. The dissent would have returned both the postage and attorney-cost claims to the district court for further proceedings. That would have allowed additional consideration, not guaranteed recovery.

What the ruling leaves open

For servicing teams in the Second Circuit, the decision separates modification-related charges from damages tied to servicing and rejects these particular pre-litigation costs. Its reach should be read with care: the result arose from the borrower’s allegations and the majority’s treatment of the expenses she claimed. The dissent makes the limits of that result plain, arguing that the statutory text supports a different view of both costs. Another panel or circuit could read the statute differently.

The appellate ruling is final; the dissent would have returned the $225 and $3.20 claims to the district court for further proceedings. That split gives future disputes a clear point of contention: whether reasonable costs incurred to get information from an unresponsive servicer count as actual damages, apart from fees for litigating a case. The decision doesn’t answer that question for every kind of expense. For now, the line drawn by the majority makes the connection between the servicer’s failure and the claimed loss central to any similar claim.

Source: Michael Garcia · www.mpamag.com